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Defendant / Appellant 
Case No. 20060969-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in allowing hypothetical testimony when said 
evidence was irrelevant, and where any probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect. This issue is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Decorso, 
1999 UT 57, \ 16, 993 P.2d 837. This issue was preserved in an oral objection made 
during trial (R. 66: 142-44). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda of the Appellant's 
Brief. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Gary Brown appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Honorable G. Rand Beacham after he was convicted by a jury of sexual battery, a class A 
misdemeanor, and intoxication, a class C misdemeanor. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Gary Brown was charged by Information filed in Fifth District Court on March 6, 
2006 with sexual battery, a class A misdemeanor, and intoxication, a class C 
misdemeanor (R. 1-2). 
On September 15, 2006 Brown filed a motion to dismiss the intoxication charge 
for lack of sufficient evidence, and to exclude the testimony of the arresting officer 
pursuant to Rules 401-403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 30-31). 
On September 18, 2006 a jury trial was conducted and Brown was found guilty on 
both charges (R. 49, 50-52). At the end of trial, Brown was sentenced to supervised 
probation for 24 months and ordered to pay a fine of $750.00, and given credit for time 
served in jail (R. 50-52). The written order was filed on September 25,2006 (R. 52-54). 
On September 25, 2006 a notice of appeal was filed in Fifth District Court (R. 50). 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Testimony of Teresa Reynolds 
On March 4, 2006 Teresa Reynolds was working at a Laundromat on Bluff Street 
in Washington County owned by her family (R 66: 126-27, 134). She and her husband 
had been taking turns doing the cleaning (R. 66: 134). When she arrived at the 
Laundromat Gary Brown was there (R. 66: 128). She had seen him there every Saturday 
(R. 66: 137). While she was cleaning the washing machines, Brown asked her about how 
far along she was in her pregnancy and she replied "eight months" (R. 66: 128, 136). He 
told her about having a friend who is pregnant with twins (R. 66: 128-29). 
They continued to talk as she moved into the middle of the room (R. 66: 129-30). 
He followed her and she testified that he "grabs my wrists and pulls me forward. And I 
try to back away for a minute. And he pulls me forward" (R. 66: 130). She tried to back 
away because she "felt a little nervous and I could smell he was intoxicated" (R. 128: 
130). Brown objected to her characterization of intoxication and the trial court sustained 
the objection (Id.). Reynolds then clarified that "He was stumbling a little bit. And you 
could smell on him really bad. And his eyes looked a little glossy also. So, that's the 
only thing I can say" (R. 66: 130-31). She also indicated that she could smell alcohol as 
she came into the Laundromat (R. 66: 131). 
After he pulled her in by the wrists Brown told her, "Mexicans make this place 
really dirty, huh?" (R. 66: 131). She agreed and then anxiously started to walk into the 
bathroom with her rag and garbage bag (R. 66: 132). Brown followed her in and stated, 
"You are really pretty" (R. 66: 132). She thanked him and walked out of the bathroom. 
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Brown tried "to pull me forward again a little bit—not pulling me forward, but whisper 
something. And, at that point, I turned out. And I felt him grab my butt, so I just left" 
(R. 66: 132, 138). She went outside and called her husband about what happened, and he 
instructed her to call the police because she was shaken up and crying (R. 66: 133). 
She called the police and her husband called his father, who was a policeman (R. 
66: 133). Her father-in-law came, took a report and arrested Brown (R. 66: 133). 
Initially there was another woman present but she left before Reynolds' contact 
with Brown (R. 66: 134-35, 137). Reynolds was sixteen years old on the date of the 
incident (R. 66: 138). 
B. Testimony of Officer Shawn Carter 
Shawn Carter is employed by the St. George Police Department (R. 66: 140). On 
March 4, 2006 he received a dispatch to respond to the Laundromat on a complaint by 
Teresa Reynolds (Id.). When he arrived, he spoke first with Reynolds (R. 66: 140). She 
was upset and her eyes were red like she had been crying, and her demeanor was she was 
"shaken" (R. 66: 140). 
After taking her statement, he made contact with Brown (R. 66: 140). 
Immediately he noticed a strong odor of alcohol on Brown (R. 66: 141). Brown also 
matched the description given to him by Reynolds (Id.). In addition, to the odor of 
alcohol, Carter testified that Brown had unsteady balance, walked slow, and swayed as he 
stood (R. 66: 141). His eyes were also red and bloodshot (Id.). His responses to 
questions were also slow and "seemed like he was trying to comprehend or understand 
what I was saying" (R. 66: 151). Carter asked if he'd been drinking and Brown informed 
4 
him that he had "consumed a 42-ounce Tall Boy within the last hour"" (R. 66: 141). A 
'Tall Boy" is basically a big can of beer (R. 66: 144). Brown also told him he'd had a 
conversation with "a pregnant white female'* that lasted about "a minute" (R. 66: 177). 
Brown "emphatically" denied touching Reynolds' butt at all (R. 66: 178). 
Carter did not perform field sobriety tests on Brown (R. 66: 141, 144-45). Carter 
didn't believe that other tests were necessary because Brown was "so intoxicated [that] 
he needed to immediately be handcuffed for his safety and for mine" (R. 66: 153). 
However, Carter testified that in the past when he'd given intoxilyzer tests to 
individuals with the characteristics he'd seen in Brown, they tested positive for alcohol 
consumption "every time" (R. 66: 142, 144). Brown objected to this testimony as being 
irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative: "The State is trying to show that the 
officer has experienced in this type of investigation that he's seen these clues before and 
has confirmed that type of thing as a strong indicator of intoxication as has been shown 
by confirmation as he's done so" (R. 66: 143). The trial court allowed the testimony and 
stated, "I'm not sure how relevant it is, though, to the particular charge against this 
particular person. It may give some background for the officer's opinion, however. And 
so, so long as it's done to suggest the officer's background and experience, I would allow 
him to give that as part of an expert opinion. If it's to suggest that anything directly 
measurement-wise toward Mr. Brown, of course, that would be inappropriate" (R. 66: 
143). 
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Carter arrested Brown and transported him to Purgatory Correctional Facility (R. 
66: 145). At the jail they have an intoxilyzer machine that was available for Carter to 
use, but he did not administer the test to Brown (R. 66: 145-46). 
C. Motion for Directed Verdict 
Brown moved for a directed verdict of dismissal of both charges for lack of 
sufficient evidence (R. 66: 154). He argued that "some evidence other than the opinion 
of an officer who had at his disposal [other tests such as an intoxilyzer]. We are in this 
case to allow him to testify to that, allowing him to make a legal conclusion and factual 
conclusion without any independent evidence for the jury to consider, we would ask that 
the court apply that standard [found in Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a part 5 dealing with 
driving under the influence], which is the only standard in the code giving us a definition 
of those things to this as a definition of being under the influence of alcohol and argue 
that the evidentiary burden has not been met and that count two should be dismissed55 (R. 
66: 154-55). 
The trial court denied the motion finding that the observations of the officer and 
witness are facts for "the jury to weigh to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to 
determine whether they understand those facts to establish the elements of the offense55 
(R. 66: 157). 
D. Testimony of Gary Brown 
Gary Brown admitted to being in the Laundromat on the day in question (R. 66: 
161). He had been there before and had run into Reynolds on occasion (R. 66: 162). He 
testified that was sitting in a chair (R. 66: 162). While there he had a conversation with a 
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lad) who was taking clothes out of a dry er and folding them on a table (R. 66: 163-64). 
While he was sitting Reynolds walked in and began cleaning (R. 66: 164). Brown 
doesn't "really remember" speaking to her "other than just a nod hello or kind of 
recognizing who she was, because she was walking around cleaning up" (R. 66: 164). He 
was doing a word search (R. 66: 164-65). He made small talk, "kind of hi, and how's it 
going, kind of thing" with Reynolds (R. 66: 168). 
Brown denied intentionally touching Reynolds in the way she described (R. 66: 
165). He denied grabbing her butt intentionally or accidentally (R. 66: 165). He testified 
that he "didn't get that close to her to be able to do that" (R. 66: 165). He was "just 
sitting there in the chair until my mom came by" to bring him laundry and lunch (R. 66: 
165, 162). He didn't know that Reynolds had been outside and was confused when the 
officers "barged" into the Laundromat and told him he was under arrest for "pinch[ing] a 
woman on the rump" and "public intox" (R. 66: 166, 171-72, 74). When the officers 
came in the room he stood (R. 66: 167). 
Brown remembers there were security cameras in the Laundromat and that you 
can see yourself on the screen when you walk around (R. 66: 166). He believes that the 
camera would have picked up where he was in the Laundromat (R. 66: 167). 
Brown testified that to his knowledge Tall Boy's are 22 ounces and not 42 ounces 
(R. 66: it>8j. He indit ated that lie ihu'sii i drink beer because it "doesn't agree" villi hum, 
and he denied being intoxicated when the police came to arrest him (R. 66: 1685 173). He 
told the officer he had consumed alcohol the previous night but denied drinking that day 
(R. 66: 173-74). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Brown asserts that the trial court erred in allowing testimony that was irrelevant, 
and whose probative value—if any—was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Erred In Allowing Evidence that was Irrelevant, and 
whose Probative Value—if any—was Substantially Outweighed by its 
Prejudicial Effect 
Brown was convicted of sexual battery, a class A misdemeanor, and public intoxication, a 
class C misdemeanor. Teresa Reynolds testified that Brown had grabbed her by the wrist 
and pulled her to him, and that subsequently he grabbed her butt (R. 66: 130, 132, 138). 
She also testified that he was stumbling slightly, smelled of alcohol, and had glossy eyes 
(R. 66: 130-31). Brown admitted to drinking the previous night but denied being 
intoxicated at the time (R. 66: 173-74). He also denied intentionally or accidentally 
grabbing Reynolds' butt, or to touching her in the way she described (R. 66: 165). 
Officer Shawn Carter, the arresting officer, testified that he noticed a strong odor 
of alcohol on Brown, that Brown had unsteady balance, walked slow, and swayed as he 
stood, and that his eyes were also red and bloodshot (R: 66: 141). Carter also testified 
that Brown's responses to questions were also slow and "seemed like he was trying to 
comprehend or understand what I was saying" (R. 66: 151). Carter asked if he'd been 
drinking and Brown informed him that he had consumed a Tall Boy within the last hour 
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(R. 66: 141). Carter did not perform field sobriety tests on Brown (R. 66: 141. 144-45). 
Carter didn't believe that other tests were necessary because Brown was "so intoxicated 
[that] he needed to immediately be handcuffed for his safety7 and for mine" (R. 66: 153). 
Carter also did not administer an intoxilyzer test to Brown at the jail although a machine 
was available (R. 66: 145-46). 
During his testimony the State asked, "Have you ever done any type of intoxilyzer 
tests on other individuals when you have seen these characteristics?" (R. 66: 142). Carter 
replied, "Yes" (Id.). The State then asked, "When you have done that, what have the 
results of those intoxilyzers been?" (Id.). 
Brown objected to this question under rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence (R. 66: 142). Namely that such testimony is irrelevant, and alternatively that 
any probative value is outweighed by its potential for prejudice: "The State is trying to 
show that the officer has experienced in this type of investigation that he's seen these 
clues before and has confirmed that type of thing as a strong indicator of intoxication as 
has been shown by confirmation as he's done so" (R. 66: 143). 
The trial court allowed the testimony and stated, "I'm not sure how relevant it is, 
though, to the particular charge against this particular person. It may give some 
background for the officer's opinion, however. And so, so long as it's done to suggest 
the officer's background and experience, I would allow him to give that as part of an 
expert opinion. If it's to suggest that anything directly measurement-wise toward Mr. 
Brown, of course, that would be inappropriate" (R. 66: 143). 
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Carter then answered the question and testified that in the past when he'd given 
intoxilyzer tests to individuals with the characteristics he'd seen in Brown, they tested 
positive for alcohol consumption "every time" (R. 66: 142, 144). 
Brown asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the officer to 
render an expert opinion that every time in the past when he'd administered intoxilyzer 
tests to individuals with the characteristics he's seen in Brown they had tested positive for 
alcohol consumption. Brown asserts that this testimony was improper for two 
fundamental reasons: 
One, evidence that other people with similar characteristics had tested positive for 
alcohol consumption is irrelevant. Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence defines 
relevant evidence as: "[E]vidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence." The fact that other people who had red eyes, 
poor balance, an odor of alcohol, and were slow to respond to questions were found to be 
intoxicated or had consumed alcohol does not make it any more or less probable that 
Brown was intoxicated at the time in question. There are a myriad of reasons including 
exhaustion, allergies or illness, crying that a person may have red or bloodshot eyes. 
Similarly there are a myriad of reasons other than alcohol intoxication why an individual 
may have poor balance or slow response times to questions. Moreover, the fact that the 
officer smelled an odor of alcohol on Brown does not necessarily equate to intoxication 
as an individual can consume alcohol or be around alcohol without necessarily being 
intoxicated. Unless the evidence "tends to prove some fact material to the crime 
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charged" it is irrelevant. Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at ^ 22 (emphasis in original) (Under 
Rule 402 other crimes evidence is irrelevant and should be excluded unless it tends to 
prove some fact that is material to the crime charged other than the defendant's 
propensity to commit crime). 
In State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 994 P.2d 177, the defense sought to admit 
testimony from an officer as to whether he had knowledge of people pulling guns on 
officers in an attempt to commit suicide. The trial court excluded the evidence on the 
basis that it was too remote to the case and therefore irrelevant. 2000 UT 8 at f 25. The 
Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's exclusion because whether the officer had 
knowledge of "officer-assisted suicide" is unot relevant to the defendant's state of mind 
at the time of the offense... [and] does not shed light on the defendant's intent or state of 
mind at the time of the offense. Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at Tf 28. In this case the fact that in 
the past others have tested positive for alcohol consumption does not shed light on 
whether Brown was intoxicated. Accordingly, because it has no probative value as to any 
material fact, it is irrelevant; and the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of the 
officer. 
Two, even if Officer Carter's testimony has any relevance to a material fact, its 
probative value is far outweighei I h the danger of unfair prejudice. Rule 403 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury...." 
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In this case, the trial court acknowledged that the testimony had little if any 
relevance "to the particular charge against this particular person" (R. 66: 143). The trial 
court also acknowledge that it would be improper "to suggest that anything directly 
measurement-wise toward Mr. Brown" (R. 66: 143). However, that is precisely what 
happened. The jury was essentially told that Brown must have been intoxicated because 
"every time" in the past Carter had tested similarly situated individuals, they had tested 
positive for alcohol consumption. 
"To ascertain the probative value of proffered evidence, the trial court... must 
necessarily measure the strength of the evidence and its ability to make the existence of 
the evidence of a consequential fact either more or less probable." State v. Williams, 173 
P.2d 1368, 1371 (Utah 1989). As argued above, Carter's testimony as to the intoxilyzer 
test results of other individuals has little, if any, probative value as to whether Brown was 
intoxicated. 
Moreover, the trial court acknowledged that any suggestion that the testimony 
implicated anything directly towards Brown would be improper. However, the question 
and answer itself connected Brown with these unnamed individuals who had been given 
intoxilyzer tests. The question was whether Carter had performed objective tests as to 
alcohol consumption on individuals who had the same characteristics as Brown and 
whether they tested positive for alcohol consumption, and the answer was "every time." 
Brown's testimony was that he had not consumed alcohol since the previous night 
but that he had slept at a friend's house and was unkept. Reynolds testimony was that he 
was stumbling slightly, smelled of alcohol and had glossy eyes. Carter's personal 
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observations were similar to Re\ nolds. In addition. Carter testified that Brown admitted 
to drinking a Tall Boy an hour previous while Brown denied drinking beer or a Tall Boy. 
None of the testimony against Brown had the objective effect of the jury hearing that 
ever}7 individual displaying characteristics observed in Brown had tested positive on an 
intoxilyzer test. Carter could have given Brown a test. A machine was available at the 
jail for that purpose. He chose not to administer the test to Brown. The question to 
Carter by the State was nothing more than an attempt to correct that deficiency by 
bringing in hypothetical third persons into the equation. 
This testimony, allowed by the trial court over the objection of Brown, was not 
relevant, and its probative value—if any—was substantially outweighed by the prejudice 
suffered by Brown as a result. Instead of the jury judging the credibility of Brown's 
statements versus those by Carter and Reynolds, this testimony created an inference in 
the minds of the jurors that an objective test of alcohol consumption/intoxication had 
been made in this case because if "every time" intoxilyzer tests were administered to 
others with similar characteristics they tested positive, then Brown, too, must have had 
the same result. Moreover, this testimony mislead the jury, and confused the jury, into 
believing that the issue was not whether Brown was intoxicated, but whether he would 
test positive for alcohol consumption. "Intoxication" is not clearly defined in the Utah 
Code, and testing positive for alcohol consumption does not necessarily equate to 
intoxication. 
Accordingly, Brown asserts that the trial court erred in admitting testimony by 
Carter concerning unnamed third parties' results on intoxilyzer tests because said 
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evidence was irrelevant, and any probative value was substantially outweighed by 
prejudice to Brown, and that it needless mislead and confused the jury. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Brown asks that this Court reverse his convictions and remand the matter to Fifth 
District Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of November, 2007. 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to Brock Belnap, Washington County Attorney, 178 North 200 East, 
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App. 1988); State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 
(Utah 1988); State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981 
(Utah 1989); State, In re R.D.S., 777 P.2d 532 
(Utah Ct App 1989) Whitehead v American 
Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990)' 
State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553 (Utah Ct. App' 
1991); State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 (Utah Ct 
App. 1992); State v 633 E. 640 N., 942 P.2d 925 
(Utah 1997), State v Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 
UT 59, 6 P.3d 1120. 
sence of other accidents or injuries at place 
where injury or damage occurred, 10 A.L.R.5th 
371. 
Admissibility of evidence in homicide case 
that victim was threatened by one other than 
defendant, 11 A.L.R.5th 831. 
relevancy ruling only if the trial court has 
abused its discretion. State v. Harrison, 805 
P.2d 769 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 
327 (Utah 1991). 
In a personal injury action, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence 
of plaintiff's prior injuries because they were 
relevant to the issues of causation and dam-
ages. Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Prods., Inc., 939 
P.2d 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Effect of remoteness . 
Remoteness usually goes to the weight of the 
evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v. 
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P2d 314 
(Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds, Mc-
Farland v. Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 R2d 298 (Utah 
1984). 
Harmless error. 
Even if the admission of testimony regarding 
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